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Abstract
Automated anomaly detection is essential for managing information
and communications technology (ICT) systems to maintain reliable ser-
vices with minimum burden on operators. For detecting varying and con-
tinually emerging anomalies as differences from normal states, learning
normal relationships inherent among cross-domain data monitored from
ICT systems is essential. Deep-learning-based anomaly detection using
an autoencoder (AE) is therefore promising for such complicated learn-
ing; however, its interpretation is still problematic. Since the dimensions
of the input data contributing to the detected anomaly are not directly
indicated in an AE, they are not suitable for localizing anomalies in large
ICT systems composed of a huge amount of equipment. We propose an
algorithm using sparse optimization for estimating contributing dimen-
sions to anomalies detected with AEs. We also propose a multimodal
AE (MAE) for effectively learning the relationships among cross-domain
data, which can induce nonlinearity and differences in learnability among
data types. We evaluated our algorithms with several datasets including
real measured data in comparison with conventional algorithms and con-
firmed the superiority of our estimation algorithm in specifying contribut-
ing dimensions of anomalous data and our MAE in detecting anomalies
in cross-domain data. 1
1This paper is an extended version of our technical report [1] with no peer review. The
difference is the proposal of our MAE and additional evaluations with real measured data.
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1 Introduction
Fault diagnosis and recovery are essential for managing information and com-
munications technology (ICT) systems to maintain reliable services. Although
the growth of ICT systems, which involves virtualization, large cloud servers,
and so on, enables advanced and flexible services, it increases the types of sys-
tem faults; thus, burdening operators. Anomalies thus need to be automatically
detected and localized through surveillance of ICT systems as a part of fault
diagnosis for reducing not only the operator’s workload but also the effect on
the services. For detecting varying and continually emerging anomalies of ICT
systems, “normal states” of the systems need to be learned from monitored
data so that anomalies appear as differences from the normal states. In ICT
systems, however, complicated relationships are inherent among cross-domain
data, which are data from different domains, such as management information
base (MIB) data, which represent network load; network flow data, which rep-
resent service usage; and syslog data, which represent states of equipment. For
example, as Govindan et al. discussed [2], lack of synchronization between the
control and data planes can cause various types of failures in software-defined
networks, and the consistency of invariants between these planes should be
maintained. The invariants will appear as dependencies between cross-domain
data, such as syslogs monitored from the control plane and MIB data monitored
from the data plane.
Network management systems (NMSs) [3, 4] are often used for network
surveillance on the basis of integrative analysis of cross-domain data. However,
the rule-based analysis adopted in these systems is not sufficient since man-
ually determining adequate rules, such as threshold, for individual monitored
metrics to express the complicated relationships among cross-domain data is
impractical. Automatically learning normal relationships from monitored data
for detecting anomalies as differences from normal states is therefore essen-
tial. Although several machine-learning approaches have been proposed [5–7]
for anomaly detection, such as using principal component analysis (PCA) [5],
conventional approaches have assumed linear relationships among data. The
relationships among quantitative data, such as traffic volume and the number
of packets, may often become linear. However, cross-domain data that include
syslog messages can introduce nonlinear relationships; therefore, conventional
linear approaches are not sufficient.
Deep-learning approaches using autoencoders (AEs) [8–11] are therefore
promising for learning the nonlinear relationships among cross-domain data.
Although applications of AEs to anomaly detection have been extensively dis-
cussed, their interpretation is still problematic. AEs can calculate the degree
of abnormality of multidimensional input data as one metric according to the
difference from reconstructed data from the low-dimensional expression of the
input data. For surveillance of large ICT systems, however, the dimensions of
input data contributing to the detected anomalies should also be specified for
localizing the anomalies. Suppose, for example, that there are two types of mon-
itored data; MIB and syslog, and expressed as feature vectors so that the value
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of each dimension corresponds to the feature of MIB or syslog data, such as
incoming traffic volume of router-A and the number of appearances of syslog ID
11 in router-B. Even if an AE detects an anomaly, it does not directly indicate
the contributing dimensions to the anomaly. Therefore, we cannot distinguish
which feature of which data type contributes to an anomaly, which is required
for localizing the anomaly. One might think the reconstruction errors of AEs,
which are the differences between input and reconstructed data calculated for
each dimension, seem to be used for estimating the contributing dimensions.
However, anomalies can affect reconstruction errors of all dimensions due to
their fully connected nature, causing misestimations, as we discuss in Section 6.
In this paper, we propose an algorithm to estimate contributing dimensions
to anomalies detected by autoencoders for surveillance of large ICT systems.
With our estimation algorithm, we use sparse optimization for keeping the num-
ber of contributing dimensions as low as possible to distinguish the contributing
dimensions from others. Through evaluations with network benchmark data
and real measured data, we argue that our estimation algorithm more accu-
rately specifies contributing dimensions of anomalous data required for local-
izing anomalies compared to other naive algorithms including that using the
reconstruction error.
We also propose a multimodal AE (MAE) for learning the relationships
among cross-domain data more effectively. The multimodality derived from
cross-domain monitoring induces two problems for AEs: one is a combinatorial
increase in normal states to be learned, and the other is the difference in learn-
ability among data types. With our MAE, cross-domain data are integratedly
analyzed using a deep AE, which effectively reduces the normal states to be
learned and takes into account the difference in learnability by pre-training and
weighing anomaly scores. The evaluation with real measured data showed that
our MAE detects anomalies more accurately than a normal AE.
This paper is organized as follows. We first summarize related work in
Section 2 and explain the principle of AEs in Section 3. The proposed estimation
algorithm and MAE are explained in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. After
evaluating our estimation algorithm in Section 6 and discussing a use case of
both algorithms with real measured data in Section 7, we conclude our paper
in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Network anomaly detection has been an important research area; therefore,
much work on it has been published. A typical approach is traffic monitor-
ing [5, 13, 14]. MIND [13] was introduced as a distributed network monitor-
ing infrastructure for detecting anomalous traffic patterns. Sketches [14] and
PCA [5] were proposed as anomalous traffic-detection algorithms on the basis
1We used the online template extraction by Kimura et al. [12] for converting syslogs into
numeric vectors as discussed in Section 7.2.
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of dimensionality reduction. Performance anomaly detection by system moni-
toring has also been extensively discussed [15, 16]. Shen et al. [15] proposed an
algorithm for identifying the symptoms and causes of performance anomalies by
analyzing monitored data related to I/O system performance. Tan et al. [16]
proposed ALERT for raising an anomaly alert in advance by using an anomaly-
prediction model according to monitored workload metrics. Other studies fo-
cused on syslogs [12, 17]. SyslogDigest [17] and online template extraction [12]
were proposed for extracting network events from syslogs. With these methods,
however, monitoring of the data of a single domain is assumed.
Cross-domain monitoring has also been studied [6, 7, 18, 19]. NICE [18]
is an infrastructure for analyzing pairwise spatio-temporal statistical correla-
tions among cross-domain data that enables anomalous network conditions to
be identified. SYNERGY [19] also detects anomalies by statistically correlat-
ing cross-domain data. Although these systems can not only detect anomalies
but also specify their root cause via cross-domain analysis, they are not suffi-
cient for detecting varying and emerging anomalies that appear as collapses of
cross-domain relationships. This is because the former uses rule-based alerting
and the latter uses conventional naive anomaly-detection algorithms which do
not take into account the relationships among monitored data. NEC Invariant
Analyzer [6] and IBM Operations Analytics - Predictive Insights [7] have been
proposed to detect anomalies on the basis of the analysis of normal relationships
among cross-domain data. Although these systems enable varying and emerg-
ing anomalies to be detected, linear relationships among data are assumed with
both; therefore, they are insufficient for learning complicated correlations among
cross-domain data that include syslogs.
AEs [8–11] have been attracting much attention for anomaly detection based
on nonlinear learning. Thompson et al. [8] evaluated an AE for detecting the
novelty in server utility data. Sakurada and Yairi [9] discussed anomaly de-
tection using an AE with spacecraft telemetry data, and Araya et al. [10] in-
troduced an anomaly-detection framework using an AE for detecting abnormal
consumption behavior of smart buildings. However, they did not discuss esti-
mating contributing dimensions to the detected anomalies for localizing failures
since surveillance of a simplex system is assumed. Tagawa et al. [20] proposed a
structured denoising AE that enables the analysis of contributing dimensions in
accordance with the reconstruction error; however, it requires prior knowledge
about the data structure and is not suitable for large and complex ICT systems
composed of a huge amount of equipment. Zhou and Paffenroth [11] proposed a
robust AE that eliminates outliers from training data as an extension of robust
PCA; however, they did not discuss estimating anomalous dimensions in test
data.
Multimodality derived from cross-domain monitoring is also problematic for
using AEs. Ikeda et al. [21] proposed a combination method of multiple AEs
trained for each domain, but they ignored cross-domain correlation of data.
Although multimodal AE models [22, 23] have been proposed for cross-domain
learning, these models are for encoding multimedia data or filling in missing
data, and their application to anomaly detection has not been discussed.
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3 Autoencoder
AEs [8–11], which are artificial neural networks originally used for dimensional-
ity reduction, can be exploited for anomaly detection as follows. By expressing
input data as N -dimensional vector x(1), the values of the l-th hidden layer x(l)
(l = 2, ..., L− 1) and N -dimensional output layer x(L) are calculated using the
following recursive formula:
x(l) = φ(l)(W (l)x(l−1) + b(l)), l = 2, ..., L (1)
where W (l) are the weights between the (l − 1)th and l-th layers, b(l) are the
biases in l-th layer, and φ(l) is the activation function. From this, we omit
subscript (1) of x(1) and simply denote it as x. AEs reconstruct the input data
in the output layer, which corresponds to dimensionality reduction in a hidden
layer since the size of a hidden layer is set lower than that of the input data.
Activation functions perform element-wise transformation and enable AEs to
learn nonlinear dimensionality reduction.
In using anomaly detection, by training an AE so that it reconstructs the
input data in the output layer when normal data is given, the anomaly score of
test data x is defined using the following mean squared error (MSE) [10]:
MSE(x) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(x(L)i − xi)2. (2)
Since AEs learn low-dimensional expressions of the normal data in accordance
with normal correlations among the dimensions, the MSE becomes higher when
abnormal data, in which the normal correlations are collapsed, are input; there-
fore, it is assumed as the anomaly score of the input data. Training AEs involves
optimizing parameters, i.e., W (l) and b(l) for l = 2, ..., L. By using training
dataset x1, ...,xT , which contains the data in normal situations, the parameters
are optimized so that the mean of the MSE with the training data is minimized
by solving the following problem:
min
W (l),b(l)
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(x(L)t,i − xt,i)2, l = 2, ..., L, (3)
where x(L)t,i and xt,i are the ith dimensional value of x
(L)
t and xt, respectively. A
representative algorithm for solving problem (3) is stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) [24], and improvements in SGD have been thoroughly discussed.
4 Algorithm for estimating contributing dimen-
sions
Although AEs are promising for use as anomaly-detection algorithms in which
labeled data of fault situations cannot be sufficiently obtained, they only calcu-
late the anomaly score as an MSE and do not directly indicate the dimensions
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contributing to the anomaly. To adopt AEs as anomaly-detection algorithms for
surveillance of large ICT systems, however, not only the anomaly score of ICT
systems but also the dimensions of the test data that contribute to the anomaly
must be distinguished. Let us suppose the use of AEs for network surveillance
by monitoring the traffic volume from MIB data. By selecting the traffic vol-
ume of each node in a time slot as the value of each dimension of the input
data, AEs learn the relationships among the traffic volume of network nodes in
a normal situation and detect anomalous behavior as a collapse of the normal
relationship. If anomalies are detected, the contributing dimension of the input
data judged as abnormal should be clarified to estimate in which node the fault
occurs. For estimating the contributing dimensions of anomalies, our proposed
algorithm uses sparse optimization. The following assumption is required with
our algorithm.
Assumption: The contributing dimensions of an anomaly are a small part of
the all dimensions, and if the values of the contributing dimensions are fixed to
plausible values in accordance with the learned relationships from the training
data, the anomaly score output by an AE will become low.
This assumption is reasonable for the surveillance of large ICT systems in
which a massive amount of data is monitored from a number of pieces of equip-
ment and a fault only affects some of the monitored data initially. According
to this assumption, if test data x¯ are judged as abnormal, we can estimate
the contributing dimensions by finding some of the dimensions that should be
amended for decreasing the MSE.
With our algorithm, vector η is introduced to express how much x¯ differs
from the plausible value for each dimension and is defined as contribution degree,
which expresses the contribution of the dimension to the anomaly. If xi is higher
than a plausible value, ηi becomes positive and vise versa. Decreasing ηi from
xi should therefore lower the MSE according to the assumption. Consequently,
the proposed algorithm to determine the contribution degree η is expressed as
the following minimization problem.
min
η
MSE(x¯− η) + λ||η||1, (4)
where the left term expresses minimizing the MSE by moving the input data.
The right term is the L1-norm of η, which is responsible for keeping the number
of non-zero dimensions in η as low as possible. This is needed to distinguish
contributing dimensions of anomalies, which correspond to non-zero dimensions,
from irrelevant dimensions, which correspond to zero dimensions. In this paper,
instead of exactly solving Eq. (4), we determine η by iterating the proximal
gradient method [25] with Eq. (4) until MSE(x¯ − η) becomes lower than the
predefined threshold for computational efficiency. For obtaining higher sparse
η, we execute our algorithm with several λ.
Estimating the contributing degree can be done for localizing anomalies in
large ICT systems as follows. An anomaly is easily localized if the contributing
dimensions simply indicate the location of fault occurrence (for example, each
dimension corresponds to the traffic volume in each node in a network and only
6
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Figure 1: Training of proposed MAE.
one dimension is estimated as a contributing dimension). However, there is still
a problem for localization if the contributing dimensions include multiple pieces
of information in multiple locations. Clustering is a promising method in such
a situation. Since the contribution degree output from the proposed algorithm
is a numeric vector, we can cluster the detected anomalies in accordance with
the vector of the contribution degree. This will ease the burden of operators
for diagnosing anomalies, and once the root cause of the anomalies is identified,
the anomalies are “labeled“ and can be automatically localized when they occur
again. This possibility of semi-supervised localizing is detailed in an evaluation
with network benchmark data in Subsection 6.2.
5 Multimodal autoencoder
Cross-domain data monitored from ICT systems should be analyzed integratedly
for detecting various anomalies that appear as the collapse of cross-domain
relationships. However, there are two problems in using AEs for cross-domain
data. (i) Although cross-domain relationships should appear in some metrics
in data, many metrics have no relationship with those in other types of data.
Therefore, the size of “normal states” should increase combinationally as the
number of monitored metrics increases. However, the volume of training data
that can be collected in a real environment is limited and may not be sufficient
to learn the normal states. (ii) Learnability of data differs in accordance with
the type of data, and the difference should be considered for integrative analysis.
If two types of data (one in which the normal states are easy to learn and the
other in which they are difficult) are analyzed using an AE, for example, the
reconstruction error of the former type will become relatively low and that of
the latter type will become relatively high. This difference affects both training
and testing, as discussed later; therefore, it should be considered.
Taking these problems into account, we propose an MAE for cross-domain
data. We introduce a five-layered model in this paper; however, the number
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of layers may be increased for more complicated learning. The first and fifth
layers are the input and output layers, respectively, the second and fourth layers
learn low-dimensional expressions of each type of training data, and the third
layer learns those of all types of training data (see the right figure in Fig. 1).
The second and fourth layers are set smaller than each type of data to reduce
the dimensions for decreasing the size of normal states to be learned, which
increases according to the combination of the number of the dimensions, as
stated in problem (i). By denoting the k-th type of input data as xk and i-th
layer of the k-th type of data as xk,(i), excluding the third layer for all types
of data and denoting it as x(3), the values of the second to fifth layers are
calculated as follows:
xk,(2) = φ(2)(W k,(2)xk + bk,(2)), ∀k, (5)
x(3) = φ(3)
( K∑
k=1
W k,(3)xk,(2) + bk,(3)
)
, (6)
xk,(4) = φ(4)(W k,(4)x(3) + bk,(4)), ∀k, (7)
xk,(5) = φ(5)(W k,(5)xk,(4) + bk,(5)), ∀k, (8)
where K is the number of types of data, φ∗ is the activation function, and
W ∗ and b∗ are the parameters that should be trained by solving the following
problem with a training dataset xk1 , ...,xkT ∀k:
min
W∗,b∗
1
T
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
(xk,(5)t,i − xkt,i)2
Nk
, (9)
where Nk is the size of the k-th type of input data.
Although the proposed MAE is trained to minimize the difference between
xk,(5) and xk similar to the normal AE for all k, it requires pre-training and
fine-tuning, as shown in Fig. 1, for learning with cross-domain data. In pre-
training, W k,(l), bk,(l), l = 2, 5,∀k are first trained to reconstruct the train-
ing data with Eqs. (5) and (8) by assuming xk,(2) as xk,(4) for all k. Next,
W k,(l), bk,(l), l = 3, 4,∀k are trained to reconstruct the dimensionally reduced
training data by using Eq. (5) using already trained W k,(2), bk,(2),∀k with
Eqs. (6) and (7). In fine-tuning, all parameters are trained using pre-trained
parameters as initial values. The importance of pre-training is often discussed
in terms of the vanishing gradient problem [26]. However, it also arises from the
differences in learnability among the types of data, as stated in problem (ii). If
we try to train the parameters of the proposed MAE at once, reconstruction
error ||xk,(5) − xk|| tends to be larger than others if the k-th type of data are
relatively difficult to learn. Such types of data become dominant in minimizing
the reconstruction error; therefore, other types of data are not sufficiently re-
constructed. Through pre-training, all parameters are first trained to minimize
the reconstruction error for each type of data to obtain good initial parameters,
and through fine-tuning, the parameters are retrained to minimize the total re-
construction error. This was numerically evaluated with real measured data, as
discussed in Section 7.4.
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The difference in learnability should also be considered in calculating the
anomaly score of test data. The MSE of the type of data that is relatively diffi-
cult to learn tends to be high and vice versa; thus, anomalies in learnable types
of data may be overlooked since the increase in the MSE due to anomalies may
be less than the MSE of other types of data in a normal situation. Therefore,
by denoting the k-th type of test data as xk, the anomaly score is calculated as
the weighted MSE (wMSE) by taking into account this difference:
wMSE(x1, ...,xK) =
K∑
k=1
wk
∑Nk
i=1(x
k,(5)
i − xki )2
Nk
, (10)
wk =
1/νk∑K
k′=1 1/νk′
, (11)
where wk is the weight of the wMSE of the k-th type of data and νk is the mean
value of the MSEs of the k-th type of data calculated with training data. Since
the MSE of the k-th type of data tends to be high if νk is high and vice versa,
the weight is inversely proportional to νk to offset the difference.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated the proposed estimation algorithm with a three-layered AE using
simulated and benchmark data. In all the following evaluations, the input data
were normalized to [0,1] by using the minimum and maximum values for each
dimension in the training data to align the effects of each feature value to the
MSE [10].
6.1 Simulated Data
We first investigated whether the proposed estimation algorithm can distinguish
the contributing dimensions accurately with simulated data. The training data
were 1000-dimensional data generated through a simulation as follows:
xi+10j =
{
N(1000, 2002) (j = 0)
(1 + 0.1 ∗ j) ∗ x2i +N(β, γ2) (j = 1, ..., 99)
for i = 1, ..., 10,
(12)
where N(µ, σ2) is a random variable of a normal distribution with mean µ and
variance σ2. With the data, it was assumed that the surveillance target is com-
posed of ten independent components and there are one random value (such
as the number of server requests) and 99 correlation values with noise (such as
server load) for each component. For generating test data, we first generated
data similar to the training data and randomly chose i from i = 1, ..., 10. Af-
ter that, we randomly chose nf values from xi+10j , j = 1, ..., 99 and increased
(or decreased) the values by r-fold, where r was also randomly determined by
9
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Figure 2: Sorted by absolute value
uniform distribution between [2,10] (or [1/10, 1/2]). This supposed that a fault
occurs in a component and affects nf values correlated with the component. The
training and test data were 10,000 and 1 records, respectively. After training
the AE, we calculated the MSE of the test data and estimated the contributing
dimensions with our estimation algorithm if the MSE exceeded the threshold
to examine whether the algorithm can estimate the actual contributing dimen-
sions. A sigmoid function was adopted as an activation function, the size of a
hidden layer was set to 10, and batch size and the number of epochs of SGD
were both set to 500. The threshold of the MSE was set to µmse+3σmse, where
µmse and σmse were the mean value and standard deviation of the MSEs with
training data, respectively. Since the MSE exceeded the threshold in all simu-
lations in the following evaluations, we only discuss the estimation accuracy of
the contributing dimensions.
We first examine whether the proposed estimation algorithm can distinguish
the contributing dimensions from others with nf = 10 more accurately than with
other naive metrics that may express the contribution of each dimension to the
detected anomaly. Figure 2 illustrates the results from a simulation when the
dimensions are sorted in accordance with the absolute value, and top 20 values
are extracted for each evaluation metric to estimate the contributing dimen-
sion, which are outlier degree, reconstruction error, contribution degree without
sparsity, and contribution degree. The outlier degree of the i-th dimension data
xtest,i is defined using the mean value and standard deviation of the distribution
in the training data, µtrain,i and σtrain,i as xtest,i−µtrain,iσtrain,i . The reconstruction
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error is the difference between the values of the output and input layers in the
AE for each dimension, that is, x(L)i −xi. The contribution degree without spar-
sity is a contribution degree calculated without the L1-regularization term. The
black and white bars show the contributing dimensions and others, respectively.
Note that the vertical axis is limited within [-1:1] to clarify small values, and the
top values are actually larger (less) than 1 (-1). In evaluation metrics other than
contribution degree, the irrelevant dimensions often have values, and sometimes
the value is larger than that of the contributing dimensions. The contribution
degree not only reduced the values of irrelevant dimensions to almost 0 but
also extracted all 10 contributing dimensions, whereas the other metrics only
extracted 8 in the top 20 dimensions.
We next discuss the estimation accuracy of contributing dimensions by in-
troducing thresholds for each metric. We defined estimated dimensions as the
dimensions that have absolute values of the metric that were larger than the
mean absolute value for all dimensions for each evaluation metric. Although
the mean absolute value was used as a threshold for comparing the evaluation
metrics, the threshold for distinguishing the contributing dimensions is diffi-
cult to determine, as explained later. We evaluate recall and precision, which
are the ratios of the number of exactly estimated dimensions to that of actual
contributing dimensions and predicted dimensions, respectively. The simula-
tion was executed 10 times by randomly generating the training and test data
with varying parameters. The mean values of recall and precision are plotted in
Fig. 3. Although recall was relatively high in all evaluation metrics, that is, the
estimated dimensions included most actual contributing dimensions, precision
was very low except in the contribution degree. This is because all the metrics
except for the contribution degree tend to have values in all dimensions, so the
predicted dimensions included many irrelevant dimensions. That is, contribut-
ing dimensions were not distinguished from others. Even in the contribution
degree, however, precision was lower than 1. Since noise was added to the data,
the irrelevant dimensions may also diverge from the learned normal correlation;
therefore, the sparse optimization in Eq. (4) sometimes failed to suppress their
contribution degree to zero. How to eliminate these dimensions from the con-
tributing dimensions depends on the threshold, and the efficient determination
of the threshold should be discussed in future work.
6.2 Benchmark Data
Next, we evaluated our estimation algorithm through the NSL-KDDDataset [27].
The dataset consist of 41 feature values about each communication and the com-
munications attribute to five classes. One is normal, and the other four are types
of attacks: denial of service (DoS), remote to user (R2L), user to root (U2R),
and probing. We used 67,343 normal communications in the training dataset as
training data and evaluated the relationship with estimated contributing feature
values and its type of communication with 11,850 communications in the test
dataset. In the feature extraction, nine discrete feature values were converted
into one-hot vectors; consequently, the number of dimensions of feature vectors
11
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Figure 3: Accuracy evaluation. White and grey bars show recall and precision,
respectively. Plain bars show results with (β = 100, γ = 50), and hatched bars
with (β = 200, γ = 50).
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Figure 4: Top features in absolute value of contribution degree
became 122. We set the size of hidden units of the AE to ten, the activation
function as the ReLU function, and the threshold of the MSE as µmse + 3σmse,
similar to the simulated data discussed in Subsection 6.1. Although we omit
the detailed results of the detection accuracy evaluation since it is not the main
scope in this section, the area under receiver operating characteristic (AUROC)
curve constructed by plotting the false positive rate (FPR) and true positive
rate (TPR) with several threshold values was a maximum of 0.76 with the AE
but a maximum of 0.71 with conventional PCA (see details in [1]). The AE and
PCA are also compared in Section 7.
We examined the relationship between feature values with the top abso-
lute value of contribution degree and the type of communications. We counted
the number of appearances of features in the top ten absolute values of con-
tribution degrees for individual communications with DoS and U2R, respec-
tively, as shown in Fig. 4. The top contributing features in DoS included
“same_srv_rate”, which is the ratio of connections to the same service, and
“dst_host_srv_serror_rate”, which is the ratio of connections from the desti-
nation host that have SYN errors. These feature values are intuitively reasonable
as the contributing features for detecting DoS attacks including SYN flood. On
the other hand, the top contributing features in U2R, which is the attack class
of unauthorized access to local root privileges, included “service_pop_3” and
12
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Figure 5: t-SNE plot. Note that a round cluster in the right figure is composed
of the data with all the contribution degrees zero, that is, the data not detected
as abnormal by the AE.
“root_shell.” The former indicates that the service on the destination is POP3,
and the latter indicates that a root shell is obtained in the communication.
Since POP3 is a representative target of buffer overflow, which is a type of U2R
attack, these are also reasonable values of contributing features for detecting
U2R communications.
We lastly show a t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) plot [28]
in Fig. 5. t-SNE is an algorithm for visualizing multidimensional data in accor-
dance with their distance. Therefore, similar datasets are plotted closely, and
the distance becomes longer as the two datasets differ. As shown in the figure,
although just plotting the test data does not indicate the type of classes, plotting
the contribution degree indicates that each cluster seems to be attributed to the
same class. This will enable the classification of anomalies by semi-supervised
learning with a small number of labels, which should be useful when the labels
of failures are not sufficiently obtained.
7 Use case with real measured data
We show a use case of both the proposed estimation algorithm and MAE by
using real measured data and evaluate the effectiveness of using AEs for network
anomaly detection while considering multimodality. The hyperparameters of the
anomaly detection models discussed in this section are shown in Table 1.
7.1 Data Description
The data are collected from a testbed network consisting of more than 100 nodes
over 43 days. The types of data are network-flow data captured at 15 points,
MIB data monitored at 36 nodes, and syslog data gathered from 117 nodes.
Note that these datasets contain a part of the data in the network since the
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Table 1: Parameters
Hyperparameter Value
size of principal components of
PCA / third layer of AE and
MAE
115
size of second and fourth layers
of AE and MAE
230 (AE) / 63 for flow, 29 for
MIB, and 137 for syslog (MAE)
activation function of AE and
MAE
ReLU (second and fourth layers)
/ None (other layers)
# of epochs 200 (AE) / 100 for pre-training
and 100 for fine-tuning (MAE)
weight decay 1E-6
batchsize 50
MIB and syslog data are not gathered from all the nodes and the flow data that
did not pass through the capture points cannot be monitored.
Twenty system failures in the testbed were reported as trouble tickets by
operators after the fact. Therefore, we examined whether the reported failures
can be detected by our MAE with the monitored data. To prepare the training
data, we first defined failure and maintenance period. A failure period is when
a reported failure could affect the monitored data. Since the actual period in
which the failure affected the monitored data cannot be specified, we defined
the period as ±6 hours from the log timestamp, which is reported as a log
sample related to the failure in the trouble ticket, as a margin for eliminating
the effect of failures from the training data. A maintenance period is when
the testbed undergoes maintenance, which is also reported as a maintenance
report with exact start and end time information. The data of the first 28 days
were used as training data, from which failure and maintenance periods were
excluded. As shown in the evaluation results later, the failure period is not
perfect since the actual periods affected by failures are unknown, resulting in
insufficient training. How to prepare “clean” training data with real monitored
data should be discussed in future work. We used all the data of 43 days as test
data, including failure and maintenance periods and examine if the reported
failures are detected.
7.2 Feature Extraction
From the monitored data, we extracted feature vectors in accordance with the
rules shown in Table 2 for each time bin (1-min. interval). For the flow data,
eight src/dst IP groups, the top ten src/dst ports, and all nine protocols appear-
ing in the training data were used for feature extraction. The feature vectors
were expressed as {v1ofk1, ..., vM ofk1, v1ofk2, ..., vM ofkN}, where ki is i-th key,
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Table 2: Feature extraction rule for each data. Each key has the listed values
and the feature vector consists of all values for all keys.
Data Keys Values Vector size
flow 8 src IP groups,
8 dst IP groups,
10 src ports, 10
dst ports, or 9
protocols
# of flows,
mean or
standard devi-
ations of # of
packets, bytes,
or durations
315
MIB 36 nodes mean or
standard de-
viations of #
of incoming
or outgoing
bytes among
interfaces
144
syslog 681 syslog tem-
plate IDs and
1 extra dimen-
sion for newly
appeared IDs in
test data
# of appear-
ances
682
such as src IP group, and vj is the j-th value, such as the number of flows. Note
that the keys of the syslog data were individual syslog template IDs, which were
extracted using online template extraction by Kimura et al. [12] and appeared
in the training data, and all newly appeared IDs in the test data. Therefore,
the number of dimensions became that of the IDs observed in the training data
plus one as an extra dimension for new IDs in the test data.
7.3 Evaluation Method
To evaluate detection accuracy, we defined two evaluation metrics (TPR and
FPR). TPR is the ratio of detected failures to all 20 failures. Since the exact time
the failure affected the data is unknown, we say that failure could be detected
if the MSE exceeded the threshold between ±5 minutes of the log timestamp at
least once. To confirm if failure could be truly detected, we investigated not only
whether the MSE exceeded the threshold but also whether the top ten features
in absolute value of contribution degree indicated that the failure was the reason
for the high MSE via checks by a network operator. To determine the FPR, we
defined normal test data as the data of the last 15 days (test period excluding
the training period), excluded failure and maintenance periods, and calculated
the ratio of the number of time bins in which the MSE became larger than the
threshold in the normal test data as the FPR. We set the threshold of the MSE
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Table 3: Average MSE of training data for each model
Model flow mib syslog
AE for each 2.04E-3 3.47E-4 3.29E-5
MAE 1.42E-3 1.80E-4 2.99E-5
MAE w/o pre-training 1.60E-3 2.30E-4 3.24E-5
AE 9.37E-4 3.31E-4 9.42E-5
to obtain an FPR of 0.03 and compared the TPR among PCA, the five-layered
normal AE, and our MAE. Note that this determination of the threshold is
just for comparison under the same conditions, and we cannot determine the
threshold in accordance with the FPR of the test period in advance. Although
one can determine the threshold according to the distribution of MSEs with
training data, as shown in Section 6.2, in advance, adequate determination of
the threshold in practical use should be further discussed in future work.
7.4 Evaluation Results
We first evaluated whether our MAE can sufficiently learn the training data
by comparing the average MSEs of training data with the models calculated
using Eqs. (3) and (9) in Table 3. “AE for each” means that three AEs were
trained with each type of data, and “AE” means that one AE was trained with
all data by merging feature vectors into one vector with a total vector size of
1,141. The number of epochs of SGD for our MAE without pre-training was
set to 200 for aligning the number of training times for each parameter. As
shown in the table, the MSE with our MAE was lower than that with the AEs
trained for each type of data since our MAE exploits cross-domain relationships
for reconstructing the input data. Although the MSE of the flow with the AE
was less than that with other models, the MSE of the syslog was higher since
the priority of decreasing the MSE of the syslog becomes lower than that of
flow, as discussed in Section 5. The AE that ignores this difference can overlook
faults occurring in the syslog as the following discussion shows.
Table 4 summarizes the detection results for each failure. Note that there
were failures in which the MSE became larger than the threshold, but the rela-
tionship between detection and failure was not clear, even though we used our
estimation algorithm of contribution dimensions. As shown in the table, 9 out
of 20 failures were detected and verified with the AE and PCA, and 10 failures
with the MAE. Our estimation algorithm revealed that these failures actually
affected multiple types of monitored data; therefore, they were detected. For
example, in the detection of TCP SYN (#3), the number of flows from a certain
src IP group appeared in the top features in the absolute value of contribution
degree, that is, the AEs detected the TCP SYN because of the increase in the
number of flows in the flow data. In addition, ping check NG (#14) was detected
because of a rapid increase in traffic volume in the MIB data in the node adja-
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cent to that in which ping check NG was reported, and the death of RADIUS
server (#5) was detected by the appearance of corresponding syslogs. To de-
tect these anomalies using a conventional rule-based NMS, we need to manually
determine appropriate thresholds for individual monitored metrics, the number
of which became 1,141 in this use case. In contrast, AEs only require training
data in the normal state and a threshold for MSE to determine if the test data
are abnormal.
Some failures were overlooked for several reasons, as shown in Table 4. In
particular, #7 was detected with our MAE but not with the AE or PCA. During
failure, there were abnormal syslogs that correlated with the failure; therefore,
our MSE was affected. With the AE and PCA, however, the fluctuation in the
MSE was not noticeable since the MSE of the syslog was lower than that of
other types of data. Our MAE could detect the abnormality of syslogs since
it emphasizes the fluctuation by sufficiently learning the normal situation of
syslogs via pre-training and calculates a wMSE to offset the difference in the
natural MSE among the types of data.
Although the failures in this use case did not appear as collapses of rela-
tionships among cross-domain data, which is the main target with our MAE,
such failures should become significant since network virtualization plays a ma-
jor role, as Govindan et al. discussed [2]. The efficacy of our MAE for such
situations should also be examined in future work.
8 Conclusion
We proposed two algorithms for surveillance of ICT systems. One estimates con-
tributing dimensions to anomalies detected using AEs to localize the anomalies
in large ICT systems, and the other is an MAE that enables relationships among
cross-domain data to be learned. We evaluated the two algorithms with several
types of data including real measured data and validated the effectiveness of our
estimation algorithm for localizing the detected anomalies and improvement in
accuracy of our MAE for detecting anomalies.
Although the contributing dimensions were estimated with our algorithm,
there are still problems to specify the root cause of anomalies. If the distin-
guished contributing features do not directly indicate the root cause, two ap-
proaches for specification can be considered. One is cooperating with conven-
tional root cause analysis functions, and the other is semi-supervised labeling by
clustering test data in accordance with the contribution degree. These should
be discussed in future work.
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